

This is the peer-reviewed, manuscript version of the following article:

Staerk, K and Haesler, B (2015) The value of information: Current challenges in surveillance implementation. PREVENTIVE VETERINARY MEDICINE.

The final version is available online via <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2015.05.002>.

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The full details of the published version of the article are as follows:

TITLE: The value of information: Current challenges in surveillance implementation

AUTHORS: Staerk, K and Haesler, B

JOURNAL TITLE: Preventive Veterinary Medicine

VOLUME/EDITION:

PUBLISHER: Elsevier

PUBLICATION DATE: 14 May 2015

DOI: 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2015.05.002

1 **The value of information: Current challenges in surveillance**  
2 **implementation**

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7

## 8 Abstract

9 Animal health surveillance is a complex activity that involves multiple stakeholders and provides  
10 decision support across sectors. Despite progress in the design of surveillance systems, some technical  
11 challenges remain, specifically for emerging hazards. Surveillance can also be impacted by political  
12 interests and costly consequences of case reporting, particularly in relation to international trade.  
13 Constraints on surveillance can therefore be of technical, economic and political nature. From an  
14 economic perspective, both surveillance and intervention are resource-using activities that are part of  
15 a mitigation strategy. Surveillance provides information for intervention decisions and thereby helps  
16 to offset negative effects of animal disease and to reduce the decision uncertainty associated with  
17 choices on disease control. It thus creates monetary and non-monetary benefits, both of which may  
18 be challenging to quantify. The technical relationships between surveillance, intervention and loss  
19 avoidance have not been established for most hazards despite being important consideration for  
20 investment decisions. Therefore, surveillance cannot just be maximised to minimise intervention  
21 costs. Economic appraisals of surveillance need to be done on a case by case basis for any hazard  
22 considering both surveillance and intervention performance, the losses avoided and the values  
23 attached to them. This can be achieved by using an evaluation approach which provides a systematic  
24 investigation of the worth or merit of surveillance activities. Evaluation is driven by a specific  
25 evaluation question which for surveillance systems commonly considers effectiveness, efficiency,  
26 implementation and/or compliance issues. More work is needed to provide guidance on the  
27 appropriate selection of evaluation attributes and general good practice in surveillance evaluation.  
28 Due to technical challenges, economic constraints and variable levels of capacity, the implementation  
29 of surveillance systems remains variable. Political and legal issues are also influential. A particular  
30 challenge exists during outbreaks when surveillance needs to be conducted under emergency  
31 conditions. Decision support systems can help make epidemiologically and economically sound  
32 choices among surveillance options. However, contingency planning is advisable so that pre-defined  
33 options allow for rapid decision making.

34 1. Introduction: State-of-the art in surveillance

35 Surveillance has been defined as “the ongoing collection, validation, analysis and interpretation of  
36 health and disease data that are needed to inform key stakeholders in order to permit them to take  
37 action by planning and implementing more effective, evidence-based public health policies and  
38 strategies relevant to the prevention and control of disease or disease outbreaks” (ECDC, 2007).

39 Although this definition was established for surveillance in the context of public health, it is largely  
40 transferable to veterinary contexts. The information of stakeholders – often referred to as  
41 dissemination – is an essential component of surveillance as it assures that the purpose of collecting  
42 surveillance data is to inform decisions. If the last step is missing, the value of surveillance information  
43 is likely to remain limited.

44 In animal health, surveillance is applied to a large number of applications. As part of a European-wide  
45 research project, reviews of surveillance activities with different objectives are being conducted.  
46 These include surveillance for emerging diseases (Rodriguez-Prieto et al., 2014), surveillance for  
47 endemic diseases and surveillance for disease freedom. Surveillance provides decision support across  
48 sectors, including government, private industry and individual veterinary practices and their clients.  
49 Surveillance standards for selected hazards are set at both international and national level, most  
50 importantly by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and published in the Terrestrial Animal  
51 Health Code. Such standards are also relevant for international trade decisions and thus have  
52 economic impact.

53 Some technical challenges in the design of surveillance systems remain. Over the last years, risk-based  
54 surveillance has become popular and progress in its development has been made (Stärk et al., 2006;  
55 Cameron 2012). For some hazards, however, considerable design issues remain. Most notably, the  
56 surveillance for antimicrobial resistance continues to challenge surveillance system design at multiple  
57 levels. First, it is not clear what the unit of analysis should be. We could focus on certain phenotypes  
58 of pathogens which exhibit defined resistance patterns against specific antimicrobials. However, some

59 genetic elements are mobile and can be exchanged between bacteria of different species. Thus, EFSA  
60 suggests that the focus should rather be at the gene level (EFSA, 2011). Due to the almost unlimited  
61 number of combinations between host species, bacteria species and antimicrobial substances, priority  
62 setting is a paramount need. Some attempts have been made, but are quickly outdated also due to  
63 the rapid progress in diagnostic possibilities. Next generation sequencing is now much more widely  
64 available and may well become the tool of choice in the near future. However, statistical tools,  
65 sampling frameworks and surveillance designs have yet to adapt to this new situation. And until  
66 international standards will integrate these new methods, even more time – possibly years – will be  
67 needed.

68 The emergence of Schmallenberg virus in the European Union in 2011 (Afonso et al., 2014) is a good  
69 example to illustrate both strengths and limitations of surveillance systems at present (Roberts et al.,  
70 2014). The first signal of the outbreak came from performance recordings on dairy farms. This could  
71 be seen as a successful application of syndromic surveillance, a relatively recent approach to  
72 surveillance where unspecific signals such as performance, body temperature, abortion rates or  
73 mortality are used to trigger investigations at an early stage of an outbreak (Vial & Berezowski, 2014).  
74 In the case of this incident, a previously unknown virus was isolated as part of the investigations and  
75 disease control measures were taken based on a tentative case definition. Using a metagenomics  
76 approach, a novel viral agent was identified (Beer et al., 2013). Emergency risk assessments were  
77 conducted with emphasis on both animal and public health. The development of diagnostic  
78 procedures was very rapid with only 3 months until validation and commercialisation; mass-screening  
79 kits were available within five months. The development of a legal status for Schmallenberg, however,  
80 took longer and remained variable across Europe. While some countries made it notifiable, others did  
81 not. It was highlighted that disease control policy should be such that early reporting of unusual cases  
82 is not penalised (Anonymous, 2012; Beer et al., 2013).

83 The Schmallerberg example also illustrates the close links between surveillance and disease control  
84 as described by Häsler et al. (2011). The purpose of surveillance is to provide information for evidence-  
85 based disease control decisions. The value of surveillance information remains therefore limited if it  
86 is not considered in a disease management context. Interventions can of course have very different  
87 features and range from extremes such as eliminating animals on affected farms to very minor  
88 measures such as information of farmers to heighten awareness or improve biosecurity. The decision  
89 can of course also be not to initiate any measures, or not yet. As animal health decisions are taken by  
90 different stakeholders, in different contexts and for different reasons, the decision making process is  
91 generally complex and influenced by many factors. Ideally, most relevance would be attributed to  
92 factual information on disease occurrence as produced by surveillance activities and the quality,  
93 feasibility, economics and acceptance of disease management options.

94 With regards to international trade, if surveillance data demonstrated a favourable health situation,  
95 and if the surveillance was conducted according to international standards or even more demanding  
96 requirements, animals and animal-derived products should be accepted by all markets. Unfortunately,  
97 this is not always how it works out. Other factors such as consumer concerns or protection of the  
98 domestic industry are a political reality. In principle, all countries being member of the World Trade  
99 Organisation (WTO) are subscribing to the principle of free trade. To protect the health of animals,  
100 plants and people, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement (WTO, 1995) allows for trade  
101 restriction measures to be taken albeit only for a limited period or if based on a formal risk assessment.  
102 A dispute settlement process is in place to address disagreements on trade restrictions. This system is  
103 now well established, and although it appears to be generally working, economic and political factors  
104 do remain active and influential in trade decisions. However, not all countries are member of the WTO,  
105 but the vast majority of major trade partners are.

106 Constraints on surveillance can therefore be of technical, economic and political nature. Consider two  
107 countries, one with a very effective surveillance in place which duly reports outbreaks at an early

108 stage, and another, with limited surveillance and therefore less ability to detect outbreaks. In the  
109 latter, some diseases may go undetected for a long time while trade still continues. This can have wide  
110 reaching consequences in the long run, if losses are higher than if control started earlier. However,  
111 short-term economic interests, fear of loss of reputation and other factors may still provide incentives  
112 for non-reporting. This is also true at the farm level where reporting decisions may be influenced by  
113 compensation as well as the fear of discrimination and stigmatisation.

114 The aim of this article is to consider technical, economic and political constraints and their impact on  
115 surveillance. We also aim to provide an overview of recent methodological and conceptual  
116 developments indicating progress in the

## 117 2. Economics of surveillance

118 In economic terms, animal production systems exist to provide goods or services to people in society,  
119 such animal source foods, wool, and leather, animals kept as companions, used for sport, work, or  
120 research. However, animal disease reduces the economic benefit people gain from animals, poses a  
121 threat to human health because of foodborne and zoonotic diseases and uses resources that in the  
122 absence of disease could be allocated to alternative purposes and therefore have an opportunity cost.  
123 The economic cost of animal disease is of growing concern given increasing international trade,  
124 changes in production practices fuelled by changes in lifestyle across the world, and changing  
125 environmental conditions.

126 Both surveillance and intervention are resource-using activities that are part of a mitigation strategy.  
127 Surveillance provides information for response or intervention decisions and thereby helps to offset  
128 negative effects of animal disease. Without relevant data from surveillance programmes, policy  
129 makers would not know if a threat was emerging, if a certain disease was present or if an intervention  
130 was effective. Expected surveillance benefits most often relate to improved disease mitigation,  
131 commonly expressed as avoidance of disease impact including a large variety of monetary and non-

132 monetary direct and indirect consequences. Examples include the avoidance of human *E. coli* O157:H7  
133 cases through identification and removal of the pathogen from the beef chain (Elbasha et al., 2000);  
134 the reduction of herds infected with classical swine fever at the time of detection and the related  
135 epidemic costs (Klinkenberg et al., 2005); the increase of value people assign to recreational fishing  
136 when controlling notifiable fish diseases (Moran and Fofana, 2007); or averting production losses in  
137 animals when controlling bovine virus diarrhoea effectively and efficiently (Häsler et al., 2012).  
138 Surveillance information reduces the decision uncertainty associated with choices on disease  
139 mitigation, and - if effective – adds value by helping to select adequate mitigation measures as  
140 required by the true epidemiological status of a population (Grosbois et al., 2015).

141 Further, surveillance information contributes to the general body of knowledge of diseases and their  
142 management and can therefore be seen as a long-term investment that will enhance the efficiency of  
143 mitigation in the future. Another major group of benefits stems from the ability of a country to  
144 demonstrate freedom from disease or infection, which facilitates trade in line with the SPS agreement  
145 (WTO, 1995), as the likelihood of importation of the disease is zero. Finally, effective surveillance  
146 produces non-monetary benefits that do not have a market price, but nevertheless have a value, such  
147 as peace of mind, feelings of safety when a hazard is absent, freedom from fear, collaborations and  
148 partnerships resulting in social capital, good reputation nationally and internationally, and consumer  
149 confidence. These non-monetary benefits are directly linked to the surveillance activity; their  
150 valuation can be conducted using economic valuation methods (e.g. contingent valuation).

151 Surveillance benefits related to improved disease mitigation result from a combination of surveillance  
152 and intervention measures. While surveillance provides information for management decisions,  
153 intervention constitutes the process of implementing measures directed at mitigation. Together  
154 surveillance and intervention achieve disease control and therefore loss avoidance, which constitutes  
155 the final outcome of interest (Howe et al., 2013). In this three variable relationship, surveillance and  
156 intervention can be economic complements or substitutes. Surveillance and intervention resources as



157 complements are always used in a given ratio and can be considered to be one input, as for example  
158 seen in a strategy that combines testing (surveillance) and culling (intervention). Surveillance and  
159 intervention as substitutes means that using more of one input requires the use of less resources for  
160 the other; the most prominent example here is early warning surveillance, where timely detection  
161 enables a response at a time when the cumulative incidence and spread (and associated losses) may  
162 not yet be too far advanced and fewer intervention resources are therefore needed to contain the  
163 outbreak (relative to a scenario where disease is detected later).

164 However, this does not automatically mean that surveillance should always be maximised to minimise  
165 intervention costs. The key consideration is whether the value of outputs consequently recovered is  
166 at least sufficient to cover the additional resource costs and, ideally, the net benefits to society should  
167 be maximised (McInerney et al., 1992). Surveillance and intervention resources for labour, materials  
168 and services are required to design, plan and implement effective mitigation measures; they include  
169 the provision of personnel (e.g. for planning, field and laboratory work, data analysis, communication),  
170 sampling and testing equipment, drugs, vaccines, cleaning and disinfection equipment, and laboratory  
171 services. While many costs vary with the design and intensity of surveillance and intervention, there  
172 are also fixed costs such as available infrastructure (e.g. laboratory and intellectual capacity, trained  
173 personnel).

174 When surveillance and intervention are economic substitutes, the economic optimum can be  
175 identified by quantifying the technical relationships between loss avoidance and use of surveillance  
176 and intervention resources, translating loss avoidance and resource use into (monetary) values,  
177 determining least cost combinations for surveillance and intervention, and identifying the least cost  
178 combination(s) consistent with the avoidance loss that maximises people's economic welfare (Howe  
179 et al., 2013). Hence, the value of surveillance information is dependent on the technical efficiency of  
180 surveillance and intervention, the value of losses caused by disease, and the price ratio of mitigation

181 resources. The latter means that if we are able to use surveillance in the place of intervention to some  
182 degree (and vice versa), it makes intuitive sense to prefer the cheaper resource.

183 Because at present, limited empirical data on these relationships are available, economic appraisals  
184 of surveillance systems need to be done on a case by case basis for any disease looking at surveillance  
185 and intervention performance in conjunction, the losses avoided and the values attached to them. In  
186 some instances, these relationships can be simplified, for example in situations where the economic  
187 consequences of an outbreak and the associated response are known to be very large, because it  
188 creates fears in consumers and changes in consumption behaviour or causes high mortality, pain and  
189 discomfort in animals and/or people, or trade bans. Then the analysis may focus on maximising the  
190 technical and economic performance of surveillance keeping the intervention fixed. Such an approach  
191 has for example been applied by Guo et al. (2014) who used technical surveillance performance  
192 parameters in simulations models in combination with a multi-criteria decision-making model to  
193 identify technically and economically efficient surveillance set ups.

194 Economic efficiency criteria allow weighing and comparing of alternative strategies to come up with  
195 measures that enable the allocation of limited funds to projects in a way that guarantee the best  
196 outcome for society as a whole (Rushton, 2009) and to help understand complex interactions and the  
197 possible effects of a decision. The leading criterion is optimisation, which defines how the net benefit  
198 accruing to society from allocating scarce resources to disease mitigation is maximised. Another  
199 criterion refers to acceptability; it allows to judge whether the benefits stemming from a mitigation  
200 policy at least cover its costs, thus making a strategy justifiable (e.g. seen in cost-benefit analysis or  
201 cost-effectiveness analysis). Finally, the least-cost criterion applies when achieving a technical target  
202 for mitigation without quantification of the benefit is the policy objective. Without systematic  
203 economic analysis, resource allocation and budgeting decisions for animal health rely on other  
204 considerations, such as technical, political or logistical factors.

205 Decision-makers must not only comply with national and international requirements and guidelines,  
206 but also consider what is technically possible in the existing setting (structure and organisation of the  
207 veterinary services and industry), follow political visions and address widespread public scares that  
208 may impact on consumer confidence (e.g. bovine spongiform encephalopathy or avian influenza).  
209 Further, they are expected to consider concerns of livestock holders and base their decisions on  
210 scientific evidence. Thus, the resources invested reflect the value policy makers implicitly attribute to  
211 the mitigation measures willingly paid to protect society from potential negative disease effects.  
212 However, if one accepts that the utility of economic analysis consists in informing decisions, it is  
213 necessary to understand and measure the relationships outlined above. An *ex ante* economic  
214 appraisal provides important information for resource allocation decisions before the start of a  
215 programme, an interim assessment shows whether the programme is on track and allows  
216 implementing corrective measures, and an *ex post* analysis allows demonstrating the value realised.  
217 Of course these phases of disease mitigation may not be so clear-cut in reality, but we believe they  
218 help understand the different approaches from an economic perspective. Generally, economic  
219 efficiency in diseases mitigation depends on the effectiveness of disease management. Therefore,  
220 both economic and technical considerations should be included when evaluating surveillance.

### 221 3. Evaluation

222 Evaluation includes a systematic investigation of the worth or merit of a project or programme to  
223 appraise its value or quality (Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, 1994). It allows  
224 assessing the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of a programme, creating an evidence base,  
225 determining factors that lead to programme success or failure, identifying areas for programme  
226 improvement, and providing justification for funding. As evaluation is a generic approach, each  
227 discipline commonly has its own set of standardised evaluation metrics, approaches and methods that  
228 may be of relevance. For example, evaluation of health information technology looks at clinical  
229 outcomes measures, clinical processes, staff adoption, patient knowledge and attitudes measures,

230 workflow and financial impact measures (Cusack and Poon, 2007), while evaluation of nutrition  
231 programmes may consider anthropometric measurements, body mass index, dietary diversity scores  
232 or blood composition (Habicht et al., 2009). Metrics, both qualitative and quantitative, constitute a  
233 reportable and systematic means for examining how a programme is performing and to which extent  
234 desired goals are achieved.

235 The evaluation of surveillance systems commonly assesses its effectiveness, efficiency,  
236 implementation and/or compliance issues. The specific approach depends on the reasons for  
237 evaluation, the client, the system under consideration, and how activities link to desired outcomes.  
238 Once the evaluation questions are defined, relevant data are collected, analysed, interpreted and  
239 recommendations made and communicated in a way appropriate to the target audience (HSCC, 2004).  
240 Such evaluation can help to identify the strengths and weaknesses of a surveillance system and  
241 provide feedback for continuation of activities with the view of achieving the stated surveillance  
242 objectives. Numerous guidelines are available for the evaluation of surveillance (e.g. HSCC, 2004;  
243 Meynard et al., 2008; Hendrikx et al., 2011; Drewe et al., 2015) including international standards for  
244 human and animal health surveillance systems, respectively, provided by the WHO (2008) and OIE  
245 (2014).

246 An important aspect of evaluation is that it should be inclusive in terms of the contributing  
247 stakeholders. Ideally, evaluation methods – typically interviews – should include the views and  
248 opinions of all relevant organisations, sectors and individuals that are affected by or benefiting from  
249 surveillance activities. Typically, these will be the providers of information such as farmers,  
250 veterinarians or laboratories, as well as the decision makers, i.e. the “users” of information such as  
251 policy makers, industry or consumers.

252 Such guidelines offer some consensus in the broad steps to follow (i.e. description of the context and  
253 evaluation process, implementation, and recommendations), but there currently remain gaps  
254 including the lack of detailed implementation guidance, the absence of a comprehensive list of

255 attributes to be assessed, and a lack of advice for the selection of attributes and their assessment  
256 (Calba et al., 2015 ). Given the large variability of surveillance contexts, objectives, approaches and  
257 designs, as well as differing interests of policy makers with regards evaluation outcomes, some degree  
258 of flexibility in evaluation (guidelines) is needed to account for variations in evaluation question,  
259 complexity, evaluation capacity, data and resource availability.

260 One aspect that is currently neglected or only treated superficially in such guidelines is the economic  
261 evaluation of surveillance. Economics implies the recognition of scarcity and the best possible use of  
262 the disposable resources. It is concerned with choices about the allocation of scarce resources to  
263 satisfy peoples' needs with the aim to achieve a desired end by minimal use of resources or to  
264 maximise a desired end under the given amount of resources. Consequently, there is always a choice  
265 element attached to economic evaluation. It therefore requires a comparison of alternatives and  
266 assessment of economic efficiency criteria which rely on the consideration of technical and economic  
267 data. This is in stark contrast to performance or operational attributes that describe a surveillance  
268 quality and can be assessed individually.

269 To make progress in the use of surveillance evaluation, the RISKSUR project ([http://www.fp7-  
270 risksur.eu/](http://www.fp7-risksur.eu/)) has developed an integrated theoretical framework and evaluation tool for the technical  
271 and economic evaluation of surveillance. It guides the user through a series of steps and pathways to  
272 help select the right evaluation question, attributes, criteria and methods to evaluate surveillance  
273 systems or components.

#### 274 4. Challenges in surveillance implementation

275 It is not only essential to decide for which hazards surveillance should be conducted, but also how to  
276 design and implement surveillance programmes. The design includes all considerations from the legal  
277 basis to the diagnostic test. Implementation may become a challenge when capacity and/or funding  
278 is limited. Providing the legal basis for surveillance may be a political challenge if there is disagreement

279 about where priorities for investments should be set and if responsibilities are unclear.  
280 Implementation of surveillance is particularly challenging if there is an emergency situation around an  
281 outbreak. The following paragraphs discuss such challenges in surveillance.

282 Surveillance is a key requirement for accessing markets and facilitating trade with animals and animal-  
283 derived food. Even if a disease is absent from a country or region, evidence will be required to  
284 document this status. To facilitate the process of determining appropriate intensity and design of  
285 surveillance, the most relevant hazards are covered in the International Animal Health Code published  
286 by the OIE. Partner countries are committed to accepting this standard and to implementing the  
287 policies defined there. If their own requirements go beyond the standard and if operating under WTO  
288 rules, more stringent policies have to be justified. Thus, the rules in relation to international trade are  
289 quite clear. If countries still have a dispute, there is a defined process how this should be addressed.  
290 Countries may also have entered regional trade agreements which may define surveillance and  
291 disease control activities at even more detailed level. In general, standards that focus on the output  
292 of surveillance leave more flexibility for implementation and are therefore preferable.

293 For hazards that are not relevant to international trade or subject to international requirements, policy  
294 setting is a domestic or industry (i.e. private) affair. This process will involve key stakeholders and –  
295 depending on the country's current practice – may have more or less government involvement. The  
296 role of government will also depend on the economic relevance of the disease and the importance of  
297 the affected livestock sector. Political processes such as lobbying by interest groups will also influence  
298 whether a disease surveillance or control issue will be put on the agenda. Similarly, ongoing outbreaks,  
299 risk of loss of international reputation, and imminent elections may all impact on whether a hazard  
300 will or will not be of political interest.

301 Government involvement is typically increased for zoonoses. In this situation, policy development  
302 tends to become more complicated because more than one ministry may be involved (Stärk et al., in  
303 press). Disease mitigation including surveillance and interventions are resource-demanding activities

304 and it may not be clear which ministry should pay for what. Data sharing may also be difficult and  
305 slow. Nevertheless, cross-sectoral surveillance may be essential to protect public health. To facilitate  
306 the appraisal of technical processes and their economic relevance for both animal health and public  
307 health, a new framework has been developed for surveillance conducted in a “One health” context  
308 (Babo Martins et al., 2013). This framework allows the economic assessment of surveillance and  
309 intervention across sectors with an explicit allocation of costs and benefits.

310 Even if policies are agreed and budgets are available, practical implementation of surveillance may  
311 not be straightforward. Capacity may be limited in terms of either personnel or equipment or both,  
312 thus requiring investment into the training of people and into the establishment of facilities and  
313 methods that are required for ongoing surveillance and disease control activities. In some countries,  
314 substantial limitations of such capacities have been identified (e.g. Namatovu et al., 2013). Developing  
315 capacity is often a mid- to long-term goal. But as an added benefit, investments into routine  
316 surveillance activities are likely to also improve preparedness for emerging diseases. Rapid detection  
317 and effective management of emerging diseases require an established level of technical capacity and  
318 general awareness among professionals. This is more likely to be present if surveillance activities are  
319 already implemented for other hazards. This was recently discussed in the context of the Ebola  
320 outbreak in several countries in Africa. The importance of general preparedness and capacity building  
321 has been identified as a key requirement for rapid control.

322 During an outbreak situation, there may be a serious shortage of capacity at all levels, including  
323 qualified personnel, impacting on both surveillance as well as intervention activities. This was  
324 experienced in an extreme form during the FMD outbreak in the UK in 2003 (Davies, 2002) when  
325 veterinarians had to be sourced from around Europe. Roche et al. (2014) showed that the expected  
326 capacity was influential on effectiveness of a control strategy for FMD and therefore also influential  
327 on the choice of strategy.

328 Some benefits are possible during an outbreak if time-consuming tasks can be automated. This  
329 requires investments during peace time into infrastructure (e.g. databases and information systems),  
330 such that location, size and other relevant characteristics of holdings are known. Using such data, it is  
331 possible to provide decision support to staff by using, for example, expert systems for setting  
332 priorities. Models can also be used to investigate possible outbreak scenarios and to estimate the  
333 impact of specific surveillance and interventions (Stärk et al., 1998; Jalvingh et al., 1999; Nielen et al.,  
334 1999; Sanson et al., 1999; Harvey et al., 2007; Boklund et al., 2009; Roche et al., 2014a).

335 While simple decision algorithms for surveillance and outbreak management are relatively easy to  
336 implement, the development of underlying disease models for scenario predictions and assessment  
337 of the impact of surveillance and intervention strategies is much more complex. Comparisons of  
338 different simulation models have shown that they provide technically comparable results, for example  
339 for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) (Dubé et al., 2007, Roche et al., 2014b). But only few such models  
340 have been applied under emergency conditions because they are technically difficult to run and thus  
341 require specialists which may not be available during an outbreak. It may also be too expensive to  
342 maintain such a high level of expertise over years when no outbreaks occur. Finally, modelling results  
343 remain uncertain and may be difficult to communicate. At the moment, such models are therefore  
344 mainly used during peace time to assess the suitability of specific control scenarios.

345 Not all diseases are as contagious as FMD and require such rigorous surveillance and disease control  
346 activities. Therefore, time is not always the most limiting factor in the implementation of surveillance  
347 activities. Of course any delay in decision making may eventually come at a cost.

348 A further complication in the management of an outbreak can be the fact that it is a zoonosis and  
349 therefore affects public health. Consumers are sensitive about food risks and can react drastically to  
350 animal-related hazards causing substantial market disruptions and losses to the farming and food  
351 sectors (McDonald et al., 1998; Knowles et al., 2007; Miller & Parent, 2012). Communication therefore



352 becomes a critical element. Risk perception is a complex process affected by many factors and  
353 communication requires expertise and needs to be planned carefully (Cope et al., 2010).

## 354 5. Conclusions

355 Surveillance for animal health and food safety hazards is not conducted in isolation but an integrated  
356 component of complex decision making. The economic perspective of surveillance confirms the  
357 intrinsic link between surveillance and intervention. Choices on disease control options are, however,  
358 subject to constraints, not only an economic, but also a political matter. As the analysis of such drivers  
359 is often not easily conducted in an outbreak situation, it is important to assess and learn from  
360 outbreaks with sufficient breadth and depth after they are over (e.g. Taylor, 2003; Hueston, 2013).  
361 Lessons learnt are valuable for general preparedness and also in order to evaluate costs and benefits  
362 of alternative control options. Economic assessments are not yet commonly conducted which is  
363 surprising at a time where resources are limited in any industry. Increased awareness for economic  
364 consequences of decisions and the extent and nature of the achieved benefits (and beneficiaries) are  
365 a pre-requisite for informed decisions. A policy cycle that includes evaluation provides opportunities  
366 for improvements, savings and progress in disease control. Such evaluation should be an inherent part  
367 of any policy and planned systematically, so that the necessary data and information can be collected  
368 to allow for a sound assessment.

369

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